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Abstract 
 
Prevailing approaches in historical studies adopt a macro view and place an overwhelming emphasis on 
the Industrial Revolution as a major discontinuity in Western development. On the contrary, recent 
research in accounting, management and business history has suggested a different direction. When 
opting for a micro-level focus, crucial discontinuities in management and accounting in the West can be 
traced back to the Renaissance Period. The paper thus searches for ‘micro foundations’ in managing and 
accounting practices to address the on-going debate on the East-West divergence. Despite the obvious 
problems with source availability, we outline a new research agenda for the debate. 
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A. Introduction  
This is a positioning paper to experiment on an overlooked area of research: the micro foundation of 
the Great Divergence Debate and some crucial questions that have not been previously dealt with. 
Accounting and management mainstreams have so far been seriously criticized for their 
Western bias, or Anglo-centrism to be more precise (see e.g. Zan, 1994, 2004; Zambon, 1995; 
Engwall, 1998; Carmona & Zan, 2002; Zambon & Zan, 2007), ignoring traditions and 
historiographies outside what is written in English. Even worse, Anglo-American management 
studies appear to have no interest in either history or the rest of the world (Kieser, 1994; Thomson, 
2001; Zan 2005, 2015; van Fleet, 2008; Rowlinson et al., 2011). Therefore, empirical based studies 
of the East are exceptions in management and accounting journals and international conferences. 
Likewise, global history is rarely acknowledged by accounting and management literatures.  
Moreover, West-centrism tends to pay attention to the East only when it dissects the West in 
some way (e.g. Marco Polo’s adventure). In any case, it is seen as a sort of mistake: why evolution 
did not take place in Asia as it could have, meaning that the East was a case of missed opportunities 
compared with the West).  
Global history is a new intellectual movement, questioning in depth some of the basic views 
of historical mainstream traditions and searching for alternative explanations within a pluralist (and 
more tolerant) view of diversities and varieties of evolution. One episode of this intellectual 
movement is the “Great Divergence Debate”, revisiting the differences and similarities between the 
East and West. Suffice it here to refer to the main research question that this debate asks: Why and 
when the East was overtaken by the West after Asia’s supremacy for centuries in technological 
inventions (paper, print, powder to name but a few). However, and as our starting point, this debate 
has a macro focus and looks at macroeconomic phenomena and aggregates. To what extent, the 
issue of micro divergence, e.g. how practices in accounting and managing were involved in shaping 
growth and development path is never addressed. 
Obviously there is a gap between macro studies on Great Divergence and micro studies of 
accounting and management to be filled up to benefit our understanding of our global past. In 
particular, “Explaining the East” would challenge management and accounting traditions by forcing 
them to face a completely different context and evolution. Just consider the different role of trust 
and “counter-role” in control; or more widely, the possible patterns of the emergence of modern 
management and accounting discourse; or again, how this could provide a different context for the 
whole debate on the role of DEB – double entry bookkeeping – in the development of capitalism.. 
Huge cultural differences will help address explicitly important elements that are taken for granted 
– and largely unexplored – when focusing on similar and homogenous contexts.  
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In turn, adopting a micro view in understanding the Great Divergence will help address 
important elements that can only be understood with this sort of zooming in, considering social and 
intellectual dynamics that are constitutive elements of both practices and changes over time. 
Paraphrasing the well-known expression by Hopwood (1987), “accounting becoming what it was 
not”, one could refer to accounting becoming what it is not in a different context. The huge history 
of public/imperial administration in China – largely underrepresented at least in terms of English 
publications – could be further investigated and brought into the debate. 
To operationalize such analysis, this paper proposes a parallel investigation between the 
Venice Arsenal (at turn of the 16
th
 century) and China (mainly the Ming-Qing Period). Such a 
parallel may sound unusual, and certainly involves delicate epistemological issues.
 1
 In the Great 
Divergence Debate circle, the focus is on the national level, usually explicitly (Edwards, 2013). 
Meanwhile, there are risks of anachronisms, e.g. in the case referring to “Italy” in a context of city-
states, be it the Venice Republic, wherein a different level of analysis would be necessary. There is 
also an issue of levels of analyses. Innovations take place at the organizational level, including the 
state itself. Indeed, we are focusing on an individual organization the Venice Arsenal, based on a 
detailed investigation on the dialogue between this entity and the governing bodies of the Republic. 
The context however is very familiar to accounting historians, the development (and spread out 
across all Europe) of the “Venetian method”. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a reconstruction of the Great 
Divergence Debate. Section 3 briefly revises the accounting history debate on early examples of 
modern management and accounting discourse, focusing on recent findings in proto-industrial 
settings such as the Venice Arsenal. Section 4 develops the research questions so that the Venice 
roots of the Renaissance shed lights on the Great Divergence Debate. Section 5 discuses some 
major difficulties with similar research agendas in term of archives in China. Conclusions then 
follow. 
 
B. A Short Review of the Great Divergence Debate  
This debate began in 2000 with Kenneth Pomeranz’s seminal monograph with the same title. In 
essence, Pomeranz and his colleagues of the ‘California School’ 2  argue that there existed two 
parallel growth patterns and trajectories in the world in the past millennium with which not only 
                                                 
1
 However, this will appear less strange in the pre-Renaissance period, acknowledging a structure of trade which is very 
anti-intuitive to image in our days: see Abu-Lughod, 1989. 
2
 The name ‘California School’ was coined by Jack Goldstone. It includes a group of avant-garde historians who all 
have their purses in California and view the world and world history from a non-Eurocentric (or non-Atlantic) way. 
They include A. G. Frank, R. B. Wong, Kenneth Pomeranz, and Jack A. Goldstone himself. 
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East Asia (China) and Eastern Europe once shared a range of similarities but also East Asia led the 
world in development. Pomeranz’s thesis challenges head on the hitherto mainstream of the 
Eurocentric view, which ranks Western Europe permanently on the top of the league table of 
growth and development in the world. With recognizable connections across the Old World (see 
Bentley, 1993; Bentley et. al., 2000), the Great Divergence Debate has opened many perspectives in 
the understanding of the different evolutionary paths in the East and West:  
 
“[The topic] is as old as the social sciences... The most popular approach is still the one that builds 
on the legacy of Max Weber and his claim that the West underwent a uniquely intense process of 
rationalisation that resulted in the emergence of capitalist market economies, bureaucratic states and 
a disenchanted culture that was ideally suited to produce science, technology and a methodical way 
of living… In this line of thinking the economic ‘rise of the West’ is almost identified with ‘the rise 
of the market’, a thesis that mainstream economists as well as their increasingly popular 
‘institutionalist’ colleagues, enthusiastically support…. Weberians focus on developments in Europe. 
They regard its history as structurally and fundamentally different from that of the rest of the world. 
To them, the Great Divergence is the culmination of a long process, not something fairly contingent 
that could have occurred anyplace. They regard what happens in ‘the rest’ as of no fundamental 
relevance to the main direction of modern Western history.” (Vries, 2010, p. 732) 
  
The recent development of the debate however started with the seminal work by Joseph 
Needham which has been dubbed as “one of the major scholarly enterprise of the century” 
(Keightley, 1972; see also Finlay, 2000). Needham’s gigantic research program aimed to 
reconstruct the contribution of China to technological developments over centuries, something that 
has previously been overlooked.
 3
 The issue emerging from the inversion of this path is that while 
importing technologies from the East for millennia, the West superseded the East, and led economic 
and technological development of the world in the last centuries. One of the major elements of 
controversy surrounding this is the exact timing of this inversion. Comparing living standards in 
China’s lower Yangtze Delta and the wealthy part of Western Europe, Pomeranz argues that the two 
areas functioned very similarly until circa 1750, positioning the China-West dichotomy in 
developmental paths centuries later than what has commonly been suggested. 
 Pomeranz’s thesis triggered such upheaval in the history discipline that scholars are now 
forced to choose between the old and more Eurocentric school and the “California School”. The 
former has a clear tint of European/Western triumphalism; the latter shows, from a very different 
angle of consumption and living standard, a universal path and pattern for both China and the West. 
                                                 
3
 According to Joseph Needham, China did not need European knowledge in most areas and developed independently a 
cluster of technologies that allowed it to lead the world from c. 100 BCE to c. 1550 CE; see Needham 1954–2008. 
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What separated the two was largely the role of historical contingencies or simply one-off ‘lucks’ in 
explaining the eventual divergence. Indeed, in the past decade the main spin-off of the Great 
Divergence Debate has been living standards and real wages in global history (e.g. Allen et al., 
2005). Divergence of proto-industrial and early modern examples are highlighted by Goldstone 
(2002: 329; 332). In our view, Pomeranz’s work still bears the hallmark of macro approaches in 
historical research and all the consequent debate shows the same propensity.  
There exist already several reviews of the whole debate which provide detailed insights 
about the topic (e.g. Deng, 2000; Bryant, 2006; Vries, 2010; Broadberry, 2013). Rather than 
providing a further literature review, we can provide some interesting observations on the impact of 
this debate within the community of Chinese historians. The Great Divergence notion and debate 
have made inroads to China rather slowly and with mixed reactions (which is somewhat surprising, 
considering the emphasis on “Chinese civilization” that often characterizes the debate on history 
and heritage in recent Chinese rhetoric). Since 1949, the fields of historical studies have been 
dominated by Marxian “historical materialism”, which was undoubtedly modeled after Western 
Europe but was disguised as the universal truth. Despite the fact that Asia has a longer written 
history and larger population than Western Europe, Asia (including China) has been labeled as an 
“exception” (or “abnormal”) with what is called the “Asiatic Mode of Production”, fabricated by 
Karl Marx. So, by 2000, the main concern in Chinese economic history was why China was not 
another Western Europe (e.g. Wu, 2001; Wang, 2001; Wang and Liu, 2001; Liu, 2001),
 
something 
that was shared by dogmatic Marxists as well as those who accepted a uni-linear growth path in 
history (Hobson, 2004).
 
In this context, the most talked about issues among Chinese historians were 
“feudalism”, “capitalist sprouts” and “undue delay of capitalism” as if China differed from 
Medieval Western Europe and Tokugawa Japan only in its super-long infancy of capitalism. 
Against this backdrop, many scholars in Mainland China, especially those of the older 
generation, find it hard to accept or accommodate the shock of the “California School” (e.g. Wu and 
Tong, 2003; Li and Jiang, 2005; Ye, 2007; Fu, 2008; Fan, 2008; Cheng and Lan, 2009; Wu, 2009; 
Fang, 2010). They cannot understand the notion that the best ideology, technology and institutions 
came from Asia (Hobson, 2004), and that China’s indigenous institutions and economy were highly 
rational and efficient and could have continued indefinitely (e.g. Wong, 1997; Hobson, 2012). To 
agree with the California School could be politically embarrassing: If China functioned so well as to 
match the West, there would be no need for change and revolutions in the twentieth century (from 
Sun Yat-sen to Maoism). As a result, the official version of Chinese history from the Qing Period 
(1644–1911) until 1949 has remained unchanged.  
On China’s mainland, there has nevertheless been an emerging undercurrent to join the 
bandwagon of the California School. For example, a large body of studies of China’s landlords 
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claimed that there was no excessive exploitation in the traditional economy of China (Gao, 2005). 
However, overall, attempts to follow up the new trend in Chinese studies of the West are patchy. 
The most common approach by far in mainland China seems to have been that of Maddison (1998) 
who had no stated social-political alignment in the debate other than sets of estimates.  
Paradoxically, the whole debate of the Great Divergence risks being characterized as a 
Western debate, with strong disagreements between Western scholars, while Chinese scholars stand 
suspiciously at the border. The most open-minded scholars of Chinese origin in the Great 
Divergence Debate have turned out to be those who left China for the West. The most prominent 
among them is probably Li Bozhong who specialised in economic growth and development on the 
lower Yangzi Delta from the Tang Period (618–907) onwards (Li, 1990, 1998, 2000, 2003).4 Li’s 
view that some regions such as Songjiang Prefecture in the delta were and remained advanced in 
East Asia technologically and institutionally, made him a natural ally of the California School. He 
did physically join the school when he took a post at Caltech in the 2000s. Another influential 
player is James Lee who specializes in historical demography and runs a population research center 
at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. Lee’s approach to the debate is to look at 
it from how a standing population was supported. The Great Divergence Debate has made his group 
increasingly more comparative across Eurasia (Tsuya et al., 2011). In offshore Taiwan and Hong 
Kong where the Marxian influence is traditionally weak, scholars of Chinese economic history have 
shifted their research attention from the repertoire period of the Yuan-Ming-Qing (1279–1644) 
when China is believed to have been well ahead of West Europe and Japan (e.g. Liu, 2012; 
Edwards, 2013).  
To conclude, so far such comparisons have mainly been conducted at the macro-level, i.e. 
macro regions (e.g. the Yangtze Delta and Western Europe), macro sectors (e.g. technology, 
services, industry, farming, and governance), and macro issues (e.g. growth, development, living 
standards), while “[t]he narrow attention economic historians have focused on the market has 
obscured the impact of other institutions – most notably the state – in promoting economic 
development” (von Glahn, 2016: 8; for a similar critique see also Bryant, 2006). Studies with micro 
approaches have visibly fallen behind. But it is very likely that the relatively separated evolution of 
civilizations in the West and in the East is not only a macro phenomenon, but could be studied as 
micro phenomena, including ways in which businesses were organized. Here, studies of family 
structures, household production, consumption, property ownership and inheritance in China have 
                                                 
4
 Li’s propensity towards agriculture is shared by Pomeranz (1993), whose early research was on China’s northern 
hinterland where the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese economy showed up most clear-cut. 
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shed some light on micro-level uniqueness (Deng, 1999b; Lee and Wang, 1999). So, intuitively, one 
suspects a divergence in business management at a micro level very early on in world history.
5
 
 
C. The Renaissance link of modern management and accounting: the Venice 
Arsenal 
When comparing the development in the East and West, scholars on both sides seem to share a 
basic assumption that the British Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century and the American 
Managerial Revolution in the nineteenth were the major discontinuities in economic and business 
history.
6
 Without intending to diminish the importance of the industrial revolution, when a micro 
perspective is taken, things change. One of the aspects characterizing recent developments in 
accounting history is the tracing back of the emergence of meaningful forms of modern managerial 
control, as far back as even the sixteenth century. This redefines what constitutes “modernity”, that 
is to say elements that are perceived as affecting only current day management and accounting 
practices (Blindquotation); see for instance: Parker, 1981; Hopwood, 1987, 1992; Mepham, 1988; 
Fleischman and Parker, 1991; Edwards and Boyns, 1992; Bhimani, 1994; Scorgie, 1997; Zan, 2004; 
Carnegie and Napier, 2002; Fleischman and Macve, 2002). The present study is located within this 
micro-level arena.  
                                                 
5
 Another critique to the debate is that so far the California school has “focused intently on developing quantitative 
measures of economic performance to test its argument, …[being] confined to issues and time periods for which 
quantitative measurements might be feasible. … As a result, little of this scholarship examines Chinese economic 
history before the eighteenth century.” (von Glahn, 2016: 6).  
6
 See for instance the following sentence, none of which will survive the Venice Arsenal’s anomaly (emphasis added): 
“The modern firm made its first historical appearance when the volume of trade reached a level at which managerial 
coordination became more efficient and profitable than coordination through the workings of the market.” (Chandler 
1977) And, “Given the small size of firms prior to mid-nineteenth century, specialization would remain confined within 
the company circle. The business would be run by the proprietors, while the need for the thorough and meticulous 
internal organization, detailed statistics and cost-calculation methods, which were to become such a marked feature of 
the modern firm, was not yet felt.” (Chandler, 1980) Also, “Before the early nineteenth century, virtually all exchange 
transactions occurred between an owner-entrepreneur and individuals who were not a part of the organization: 
transactions occurred in the market and measures of success were easily obtained. As a consequence of the Industrial 
Revolution and the ability to achieve gain through economies of scale, it became efficient for ... owners to commit 
significant sums of capital to their production processes. ... The long term viability and success of these ‘managed’ 
organizations revealed the gains that could be earned by managing a hierarchical organization. ... The emergence more 
than 150 years ago of such organizations created a new demand for accounting information. ... (A) demand arose for 
measures to determine the ‘price’ of output from internal operations, ... owners devised measures to summarize the 
efficiency by which labor and materials were converted to finished products, measures that also served to motivate and 
evaluate the managers.” (Johnson & Kaplan, 1987, pp. 6-7) 
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An interesting characteristic of this stream of research is rediscovering the role of state 
bureaucracies in the development of modern management and accounting discourse (and the 
development of capitalism itself). A particularly intriguing case is the Spanish Royal Tobacco 
Company (Carmona et al., 1997), where a rather sophisticated discourse about managing and 
management control existed in a context far from what it is normally assumed the driving force of 
similar solutions: a monopoly run by the state, before industrial revolution. Another intriguing case 
is indeed the development of management and accounting discourse in the shipbuilding of the 
Venice Arsenal in the sixteenth century, which we use here as a sort of “benchmark”, for its 
potential in falsifying mainstream views in accounting, business and economic history, and the 
identification of major discontinuities (blind-quotation).  
This research builds on the discovery of a periodic set of reports that the people in charge of 
the shipbuilding entity (the Arsenal) had to prepare for the Senate of the Republic, since 1580. The 
research was looking at these reports in terms of discursive regularities and change. Which 
“chapters” were present at the beginning, which ones were maintained and which new ones were 
introduced later? In which ways the same “chapters” were dealt with over time, in case with what 
kind of changes? One can further infer what the worries, issues, and priorities were. In short, how 
attention was addressed (according to March, 1978, management is essentially an issue of 
addressing attention). What emerges is the existence of a sophisticated conversation over the 
organization of the Arsenal. That is, an on on-going discussion on managing issues relating to: (a) 
the degree of achievement of the output level (set by the Senate at 100 light and 12 great galley); (b) 
the sourcing of materials; (c) labor force, in terms of availability and discipline (in present-day 
terms, absenteeism and productivity); and (d) the conditions under which manufacturing processes 
were undertaken in terms of both production levels and organization (in particular, discussions 
about decisions on contracting-out and work discipline and control). A document prepared in 1586 
by Baldisserra Drachio is of a particular interest, representing a systematic proposal to reorganize 
the whole activity inside the Arsenal: 
 
“[T]he whole scheme is permeated by a performative principle that viewed an implicit notion of 
efficiency not as a tool for maximizing economic returns but as a moral imperative for the safety and 
prosperity of the Venetian Republic. Examination of the organization of production and logistics 
touched on a variety of different matters, including the best techniques and methods for cutting, 
shipping and storing timber. The crucial issue of component standardization was then discussed, 
with a call for the creation of a “common timber” to overcome the individual character of the 
component design and construction process (hitherto entrusted to each single craftsman), in order to 
move away from a workshop model of organization in shipbuilding. Attention also focused on 
redesigning the manufacturing plant's layout in order to make a more rational use of space, in line 
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with the demands of production. The issue of labor organization, to use present-day terminology, 
was addressed, on the one hand, with a definition of task-specific work teams and, on the other, with 
detailed debate on procedures for monitoring work attendance and performance. Lastly, the overall 
organizational structure was discussed and a proposal for a single top-level structure, endowed with 
significant powers, was put forward.” (self-quotation) 
 
Serious accounting implications soon emerge. Another couple of innovative documents 
were written less than a decade later, in 1593 and 1594, by Bartolomeo Tadini, the chief accountant 
of the Arsenal. Tadini was worried about theft and suggested various solutions to solve the problem. 
He also was concerned with one of the contradictions in the Arsenal in terms of workforce. 
According to the rules of the guilds, workers were “enrolled” at the Arsenal, which provided them 
with the right to come to work, without imposing them the duty to actually get to the Arsenal. 
Whether they were showing up or not, was largely out of the control of the Arsenal. Tadini was 
clearly aware of such a hybrid solution, wherein the organization has already internalized the labor 
force, but it was not in control of it. For this purposes he was suggesting both carrots and sticks. 
The latter implies physical control on the workers, in order to reduce material appropriation, and to 
control the effective presence of the workers on site. The former - more interesting – involves some 
suggestions in order to design what we nowadays will call “incentive mechanisms” to increase the 
presence and effectiveness of workers: 
 
“In an effort to involve gang bosses, what was suggested is a sort of half-yearly productivity target 
with related incentives (corresponding to approximately 10% of normal wages). This was to be 
accompanied by a set of scheduling mechanisms covering the coming week, to be updated weekly 
after checking the extent to which the previous week's schedule had been fulfilled. While “middle-
level workers” were offered the carrot, rather more repressive control regulations were suggested for 
disciplining the unskilled workforce, and a series of incentives for unbroken attendance, checks on 
attendance and devices for registering movements were proposed. Lastly, Tadini put forward a 
special ad hoc work-team structure, to which was, earmarked an annual budget setting out the 
savings to be achieved by the proposed structure.” (self-quotation) 
 
In the following period, further analytical innovation emerged, with additional refinement in 
managing people, outcomes and the relationships between the two. The notion of cost emerged in 
the documents (it was not present in the early ones); the notion of "work in progress" emerged in a 
document in 1633, with a new metrics of man months. In addition, other innovation took place, 
such as forecasts and expenses relating to consumption materials, and calculative practices 
regarding the workforce (i.e. labor needs based on technical parameters; or outcomes target that 
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could be reached with a certain amount of labor). A new “chapter” also emerged in the document of 
1633, i.e. costing the overall production of galleys: 
 
“To all of this was added a further new development: the systematic use of concepts and data 
regarding annual consumption and costs of materials, culminating with the astonishing document by 
Molin in 1633 … which presented the cost of manufacturing extra-large and light galleys. In 
substantive terms, comments about consumptions of material and waste of working time can be 
found (Molin, 1633). A more aware discourse on resources of the Arsenal makes it possible to 
question of feasibility of the 100 galleys goal, autonomously self-reducing the goal to 50.” (self-
quotation) 
 
In short, the Venice Arsenal at the turn of the 16
th
 century appeared as a sort of hybrid 
organization, that has already internalized labor relationships, but still being far from imposing 
control and discipline on the workers inside the Arsenal (with a gap between enrolled and active 
workers which will be a major issue for decades). Employing 2,000-3,000 workers, the Venice 
Arsenal was one of the largest and most important factories of the period in Europe, known as the 
“workshop of wonders”. Investigating discursive regularities and changes inside the stream of 
documents available at the State Archive in Venice, the development of sophisticated managerial 
knowledge and accounting metrics emerges. The period of 1580-1633 can be viewed as one in 
which important notions and metrics were constructed within a discorso sul maneggio, an 
expression explicitly used by Drachio, 1586.
7
 The notion of work in progress expressed in man-
months, or the notion of cost itself, were not there in the early documents of this period but 
“emerged” toward its end; a complex discussion about the goal itself of the 100 galleys and its 
feasibility is carried out in later documents. A logic of resource allocation of alternative ways of 
organizing and the associated budget is there developed (see for instance Drachio and Tadini about 
the design of workers’ gangs).  
The construction of a new body of knowledge has been developed on learning associated 
with a process of recording and reporting. Something much richer, profound and sophisticated that 
what accounting history textbooks tend to describe for this period, as a mere diffusion of 
bookkeeping (e.g. Melis, 1950), where costing and accounting for decision making is seen to have 
emerged two or three centuries later (see again the quotation of Johnson & Kaplan in a previous 
footnote).
8
 
                                                 
7
 As it is now accepted, maneggiare – literally handling – is the verb from which the term management comes from. 
8
 For sure, the case of Venice itself is quite unusual in its own period: what matters it is a peculiar combination of 
political/military pressure (the scare of the ottomans) within a complex process of permanent production. The associate 
decision of the 100 galley reserves made it hard to deal with day to day operations, giving rise to the whole evolution of 
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If our understanding is correct, there are several elements in this proto industrial setting that 
are of interest for a discussion on the East-West divergence, looking at the conversation about 
managerial and accounting issues. First of all, relevant innovations in management and accounting 
(here intended as bodies of knowledge, not necessarily already institutionalized as disciplines) can 
be found before, elsewhere, for different reasons compared to what is normally assumed in business 
history, overcoming some of the limits of mainstream historiography: a view that has been 
characterized by Anglo-centrism, firm-centrism and economic reductionism (blind-quotation). The 
social construction of sophisticated discourse about managing and accounting (in Europe) can be 
found: a) at the turn of the sixteenth century rather than in industrial/managerial revolutions; b) in 
some European state bureaucracies more than in private business contexts in the UK and later US; 
and c) in contexts where economies of scale are not relevant, and where an issue of cognitive 
dominance of organizational complexity is crucial.  
Interesting enough, with no direct concerns with the notion of profit, for the Arsenal was not 
even a firm in itself (it simply got appropriations from the Republic and faced expenditures, without 
“selling” anything, simply transferring the output and the end of the production process or when 
needed). In this sense, the whole debate on the role of DEB seems to be misplaced, biased by the 
notion of firm and profit, not taking into account that double entry was extensively used inside the 
state bureaucracy.
9
 This has important implications in terms of a new discourse about managing and 
accounting. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
reports. Other shipyards were in completely different situations, both military and administratively. Genoa only had a 
reserve of 14 galleys, which were bought from private shipyards. In Barcelona, ships were confiscated from the private 
for war purpose, paying back a rent at the end, considering the degree of use of the ships. The Ottomans were running 
several shipyards as internal military bodies. 
9
 Interesting enough, there are many criticisms against the Sombart thesis, under different aspects. None of these 
however criticizes the direct and exclusive reference to the private firm of the analysis. Take as an example the 
following quotation from Yamey (1949: 119), focusing on “the simple question provoked by the thesis, namely, the 
contribution of double-entry accounting to the solution of problems in business organisation and administration.” At 
this stage, one could expect that this apply to all organizations and administrations, including public bureaucracies: but 
then he goes on in a completely different direction, with “reference to business accounting records from the sixteenth to 
the early nineteenth centuries, and more particularly to English records”. Two other dense statements by Yamey where 
preceding this sentence: “I shall try to show that, in the period covered in this study, this contribution not only was 
small, but also that it was not made by those features of the system or in solving those business problems particularly 
emphasised by Sombart. I also suggest, incidentally, that, in the context of the solution of business problems, double-
entry accounting was not greatly superior to less elaborate methods of accounting.” While our research on the Venice 
Arsenal will totally disconfirm the first part of the first sentence (contributions were huge indeed), one could agree on 
the second part of it (not the contributions expected by Sombart) as a sort of understatement. We leave the second 
sentence sharing a non-fetishist understanding of DEB. 
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More explicitly, what drives the writers of some of the most important documents on the 
Arsenal is the substantive notion of “common good” of the Republic as a whole (e.g. Drachio in 
1586 justifying the need to reorganize logistics and labor force to reduce wastage in a situation of 
increasing scarcity of wood). 
The streams of documents on “management discourse” at the Venice Arsenal were already 
related to West-East relations though the Middle East (see Vries 2002 on the role of the states). 
After the victory over the Ottomans at Lepanto in 1571, Venice had a new and more powerful fleet 
(Lane, 1973).
 10
 The Senate made a decision to produce a reserve of 100 gales plus 12 great galleys 
for war,
11
 though this request was hard to achieve. As a result, to urge and focus the achievement of 
the reserve, a stream of reports was requested by the Senate. The new routine of reporting was in 
itself driving an important learning process in developing a discourse about the management and 
accounting of the Arsenal. 
Moreover, the environmental and cultural environment in which the Arsenal documents 
were generated was unique. One could argue that the discorso del maneggio and the development of 
accounting discourse were embedded in the Renaissance period, well beyond what is normally 
assumed within the “Sombart/Yamey controversy” about the role of double entry in the 
development of capitalism. It is not the mere double entry techniques that matters in the Venice 
discourse about accounting nor the lack of consciousness about the history of their discipline by 
management scholars themselves (Pfeffer, 2009, on the “60 years of management”). Galileo himself 
was involved in the Arsenal in this very period (just a few years later than the Drachio and Tadini 
investigations), and he explicitly acknowledged how he gained knowledge from the Arsenal’s 
experts in developing his new science of material resistance (their “inherited experience” and 
“observations”). 12  Indeed, as Valleriani (2010) puts it, “[t]he representatives of the practical 
knowledge of the Arsenal … finally offered Galileo centuries of experience, constituted of not only 
                                                 
10
 One could speculate more technically of the innovations that the Venetians introduced in navy warfare, for the first 
time using cannons on board, which completely surprised the Ottoman admirals. A small, incremental improvement on 
gunpowder and cannon if seen in long term evolution of warfare, which however was extremely rewarding in the short 
period: the victory of Lepanto (see Morin 2002 for a review from a military history point of view). 
11
 To be more precise, the decision about the 100 galleys have been around since 1546, but never taken seriously. After 
Lepanto and the new Turkish fleet unexpectedly rebuilt in just a few months, the decision was re-issued and empowered 
(self-quotation: 153). 
12
 “The constant activity which you Venetians display in your famous Arsenal suggests to the studious mind a large 
field for investigation, especially that part of the work which involves mechanics; for in this department all types of 
instruments and machines are constantly being constructed by many artisans, among whom there must be some who, 
partly by inherited experience and partly by their own observations, have become highly expert and clever in 
explanation.” (Galileo, 1638) 
 12 
 
qualitative statements, but even quantitative indications, which Galileo integrated into his new 
cantilever model.” (p. 150, emphasis added) And, “Galileo … found among the masters of the 
Arsenal the knowledge he needed to determine the ratio between the dimension and weight of a 
solid body that defines its resistance to fracture.” (p. 147) 
Finally, there is little space in this context for an explanation of managerial and accounting 
knowledge and practices that were so crucial for current and future economic developments which 
echoes the “ethic of capitalism” coined by Weber (Fischoff, 1944).13 
 
 
D. The Renaissance roots of management and accounting discourse and the 
Great Divergence in Eurasian history: some contextual elements 
All these considerations can be seen as critiques to mainstream economic/business/accounting 
histories (or historiographies) which focus on development in the West. In a sense, the “Venice 
anomaly” is part of the internal controversies in economic developments within the West.14 What 
happens if we apply the “Venice anomaly” to the Great Divergence Debate in economic history in 
general and focus on the micro economy? Can these differences at the micro-level help explain the 
timing and patterns of the divergence (in a sense: how did the West become “more advanced” and 
earlier than normally assumed by mainstream economic history)? Alternatively, is it simply a 
question of a lack of perspective due to the lack of micro research into the East (and particularly 
China)? In other words, would the Venice case address issues that are ontological or perspectival in 
nature?  
A similar micro view would also be beneficial in understanding China. If we accept the 
claim that China was once a maritime power and production power in manufacturing ships and 
industrial goods, which were once second to none in the world: the Ming Armada across the Indian 
Ocean with silk textiles, wall-papers, and porcelain for the export markets (Deng, 1997, 1999a). 
What is certain is that similar archival research is not currently available on ancient Chinese 
organizations (i.e. extensive reading of archival documents reporting discussions and questions in 
                                                 
13
 Interestingly enough, even the Royal Tobacco Factory innovations introduced under Carlos III have nothing to do 
with the thesis, for this modernization was led by a Catholic king, in a Catholic country, coming from a previous 
Catholic kingdom etc. 
14
 Usually the term anomaly is used with reference to a specific explanation or theory; here the term is used in a broader 
sense, contrasting the archival findings of recent researches on the management of the Venice Arsenal in the turn of the 
sixteenth century, compared to what is normally assumed in accounting history. 
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running one single entity).
15
 Before investigating possible explanations for this lack of archive-
based research and in case trying to identify suggestions for a possible research agenda, some 
general elements of the different institutional context that historically characterized the Chinese 
experience at the micro-level, need to be taken into account. This will assist in understanding the 
similarities and differences in growth trajectories and path dependencies.  
We are addressing a new perspective for the Great Divergence Debate, calling for attention 
on a few broad issues that need further research according to our view: 1. How different was China 
in micro-business practices? First, Chinese firms were predominantly family ones which were 
owned and managed within a family/clan; second, genuine joint stock companies emerged very late 
in China (in the late 19
th
 century). State-run workshops did exist but their number and output were 
very limited (no more than 10 percent in China’s total GDP) in an overwhelmingly private 
economy. Only when joint stock companies arose, did these two sectors entwine for the first time. 
Such characteristics almost certainly shaped how micro management was conducted in China. The 
separation between ownership and person was absent, and as limited liability was underdeveloped, 
it made accountability less stringent in China (it proved unnecessary to clearly define the 
boundaries of the business entity, to give report etc.). As family/clan firms in China were built on 
having close personal relationships, a high degree of tacit-ness removed the need for detailed and 
transparent accounting (see Tong, 2009; Zheng, 2010). Such striking micro-level uniqueness 
deserves our attention. In comparison, in the Venice there existed the separation between the 
“principal” (the Senate of the Republic) and the “agent” (the Arsenal), each with its own identity.16 
2. Our view is that differences in other business institutions, such as guilds, may serve as 
proxies for micro management. Particularly, the different nature of guilds – as State administrative 
units in China (Moll-Murata, 2006; Akien & Lu 1993a, 1993b; Fu 1971) vs. free economic entities 
in Europe (e.g. Epstein, 1998, 2008; De la Croix et al., 2016) – is likely to have played a major role 
in a micro-divergence process. At a general level, comparing guilds as they were in China as 
opposed to Europe, the more proactive nature of the latter in the long run seem to corroborate a 
revisionist position (Epstein and Prak, 2008): indeed the juxtaposition of guilds and innovation was 
not an oxymoron (MacLeod, 2008). Guilds in the West seem to have played a crucial role in the 
evolution of economic relationships when compared to Chinese ones which were often the 
                                                 
15
 ‘It is exceedingly difficult to construct reliable quantitative indices for the economic history of premodern China, given the 
unevenness and paucity of relevant statistics and quantifiable records on prices, wages, costs, incomes, resources, output, etc. for any 
period much earlier than the Republican era” Bryant, 2006: 421). On the issue of sources see also von Glahn, 2016: 6. 
16
 By the way, this seems to corroborate the role of State bureaucracies in the development of capitalism, despite the 
lack of explicit focus which is normally referred to (see also O’Brien, 1999a, 1999b). 
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extension of the state apparatus per se and whose autonomy was rare (see Kao, 1965; Moll-Murata, 
2008).  
The modernity of the Arsenal case at the turn of the XVI century is already the overtaking of 
a workshop or guild organization, though the process took time, and the Arsenal was a sort of 
hybrid organization for a while.  
In Ming-Qing China, guilds were politically and ideologically overshadowed by the state 
due to the well-entrenched Confucian bias towards state management (or statecraft), Confucian 
mindset of social stratification (with the four layers made of the literati, the peasantry, artisans and 
merchants), and Confucian mistrust of artisans and merchants (Chen, 1911). As a result, guilds were 
de facto official organs to monitor and control artisans and merchants. In this context, it would be in 
the best interest of the artisans and merchants not to keep detailed accounting records in order to 
avoid political and business troubles with the state. If accounting mattered in the past, the possible 
implication could be that without accurate accounting technique, micro-level business efficiency 
suffered, hence the micro-root of the Great Divergence. 
3. Writing within the administrative decision-making process is a crucial element. For 
instance, Chinese businessmen, seem to have relatively lower incentives to learn how to read and 
write, although they had to be numerate as required in doing business. This was largely the result of 
the Confucian class stratification. Usually merchants and their sons were not allowed to become 
officials or join the literati with full membership, even if they were well educated and active in 
donating to educational institutes (Zhang, Ma and Zhu, 2000; Tang, 2003). On the other hand, well-
educated writers may not have been involved in business as professional merchants. In this regard, 
there may have existed a mismatch between a reasonable level of literacy and poor provision of 
business records in traditional China. 
It would be interesting to compare the situation in the West at a more general level. Surely, 
compared with Venice and its environment, this is one of the huge differences. Writing seems to be 
a “normal” activity for many of the individuals involved in the Arsenal activity, either professionals 
or politically appointed figures. As Valeriani (2010: 117-53) reveals, Galileo himself was able to 
interact with some of the people inside the Arsenal about issues addressed by Aristotle on the Art of 
Navigation; and many people were “writing” in the context of the reports on the Arsenal which are 
found in the Venice archives, including professionals and technicians.  
Indeed, the issue of “writing” is what constitutes one of the elements of interest of the 
Arsenal anomaly in two aspects. First, this is one of the earliest documentations in the West – so far 
at least – directly and thoroughly addressing issues of management in textual forms to be shared by 
a community of experts and “writers”. Second, there is a long tradition of extensive writings 
associated with the Venetian government (the State Archive in Venice consists of 62 kilometers of 
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shelves). Regarding the particular case of the Arsenal for the period in question, there is an 
additional dimension related to writing about management, i.e. the military concerns of the supply 
of 100 galleys. In a sense, this early example of text about management is almost a byproduct of 
other needs that dictated the managerial discourse.  
Little is known about Chinese managers and how they worked. The reasonable assumption 
here is if someone with a merchant background sought a good education and consequently obtained 
Imperials Degrees he then joined the gentry class. This was common at least in the nineteenth 
century. With this social mobility-cum-self-selection, the majority of merchants who stayed on were 
almost certainly less educated. If so, what did low human capital do to micro-level management and 
its efficiency in China? 
4. Numeracy with/without writing. Counting in itself, and technologies of counting, has such 
an important impact on the ways of calculating and managerial practices. Why a civilization 
decided to write and the other did not is one of the most fascinating issues (see for instance the 
extent of abacus diffusion even today). This can work as a hypothesis. However, with money, the 
group that cannot write should be able to hire someone who can. Indeed, ordinary members of the 
Chinese gentry were available for hire to perform a range of tasks (Chang, 1955, 1962). The 
question then becomes why and how Chinese merchants did not hire them for record-keeping.  
5. The role of the state and its administration. Despite the ideology of “laissez-faire”, the 
role of the state in economic development has been addressed as one of the most important factors 
that enabled the capital accumulation that contributed to the whole take-off process (on the military 
underpinnings of the UK Industrial Revolution see O’Brien 1999a). In contrast, the history of the 
central state in China after the Song dynasty and the invasion from the Mongols and the Manchu 
was much weaker: a very small bureaucratic apparatus considering the size of the country, with 
minor impacts in the economic life inside the country (Deng G., 1999; Deng K., 2011).
17
 
Interestingly, this applied for such a long period until the collapse of the Empire. Although 
characterized as more a commercial than a military power, the governing bodies of the Republic 
were vast in Venice, and so was the state. 
Despite the many questions we are not able to provide answers to, the issues raised above 
signal serious differences at the “ontological level”: it is likely that businesses were run in 
significantly different ways in the two contexts. Yet, the lack of historical data about sophisticated 
practices in ways of managing could represent a perspectival issue as well. This will not be very 
different from what happened to the debate about the West, where a huge literature exists in 
                                                 
17
 Quite ironically, von Glahn (2016: 10) comments: “During the late imperial era, China’s rulers embraced the neo-
Confucian ideological abhorrence (not unlike that of neoclassical economics) to state interference in the private 
economy.” 
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mainstream historiography, yet lacking the specific lenses of organizing and managing as in the 
case of Venice and the “Venice anomaly”. 
 The lack of data/evidence is not in itself sufficient to argue that management practices did 
not show elements of modernity toward a construction of a body of knowledge and management 
discourses of some kind, whether similar to or different from what occurred in Venice at the turn of 
the 16
th
 century. Given the presence of complex activities in China for such a long period (ahead of 
the West across many sectors, as acknowledged by the whole debate on Chinese civilization), it 
would be beneficial to discover documents that in one way or another represent discussions, 
controversies, decisions querelle, concerning the running of complex proto-industrial businesses.  
 Adopting a management and accounting history perspective in such research, we are not 
necessarily interested in actual innovations, revolutionary discontinuities in technology, production 
or distribution aspects. Rather, following March’s (1978) definition of management as addressing 
attention (a more sophisticated perspective rather than the practitioner way of defining management 
as “getting things done”) we are searching for reconstructing episodes, anecdotes, local contexts, all 
in a micro perspective. Whatever the outcome (in terms of innovations in ways of production for 
instance), we are interested in the throughput along the process and in analyzing the construction of 
a discourse about ways of organizing things. To achieve that, one needs to find a complex set of 
documents related to micro-level production activities. This is where our research agenda becomes 
particularly challenging. 
 
E. Potential management discourse in economic history of China: ideas for a 
research agenda  
Following the previous discussion, one in principle would ideally like to structure a comparison 
between Venice and Song China (960-1279), the first documented intensive growth in Eurasia, 
curiously referred to as the equivalent of the European Renaissance.
18
 During the “Song Economic 
Revolution”, China’s non-farming sectors boomed and their efficiencies improved (blind-quotation: 
ch. 6; Hartwell, 1962, 1966; Wagner, 2001). It is largely unknown what sort of micro-level business 
management made the Song Economic Revolution possible: again, the whole debate seems to share 
                                                 
18
 “Miyazaki Ichisada, in his 1950 book East Asia’s Modern Age, linked the Tang-Song transition to the European 
Renaissance, both of which exhibited the secularization of society and culture and the rebirth of national philosophy on 
one hand, and the rise of cities, commerce, and the free disposition of property and labor on the other, that have become 
hallmarks of the modern world.” (Gahl 2016: 2) 
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a market driven focus
19
, ignoring the institutional, organizational and knowledge base of this 
development.
20
 Unfortunately, the Song growth was ended by the brutal Mongol invasion and 
conquest, and the following periods never achieved the degree of development (especially in 
relative terms, towards the rest of the world) of the Song (“involutionary patterns”, as referred by 
Huang, quoted by von Glahn: 4). What particularly matters here is that the Song archives did not 
survive.  
What we are facing in our ideal comparison is a serious informational asymmetry: we have 
abundant access to micro-level management primary sources for Venice (in its unique situation of 
high military pressures and internalized permanent production) but not for China. There is also an 
information asymmetry regarding China: we have some information of China’s macro-level growth 
and development, but little about how economic agents behaved in an industrial firm, particularly if 
related to the state bureaucracy.  
Undoubtedly, China had official archives. All the dynastic histories serve as the hard 
evidence (Anon, 1986). However, it was standard practice that once the official history of a demised 
dynasty was compiled by historians of its succession dynasty, the official archives of that demised 
dynasty were to be destroyed, apart from “veritable records of emperors” (shilu) for political and 
ideological purposes. The only exception is the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) because its official 
history has not been published to date.
21
 Yet, through triangulation with existing secondary sources 
it could still be possible to find some indirect evidence that complex situations, probably not any 
less challenging than what was happening in Venice in the 16
th
 century, existed in China’s firms, 
too.
22
 This suggests that some forms of sophisticated knowledge to deal with managerial 
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 “The increased output at many eleventh-century Chinese enterprises was stimulated by growing demands for ferrous 
metal products, which made it profitable for ironmasters to increase the scale of their operations and to adopt 
technological innovations which lowered unit costs.” (Hartwell, 1966: 33) 
20
 The Western literature ignores the developments of accounting in China; in turn, unfortunately not that much of 
Chinese accounting history or research in general is available in English (for a couple of useful reconstructions of 
debates see Ji, 2000, and Chen & Chan, 2009). According to Aiken & Lu (1993: 163), at the time of Zhou dynasty, 
“accounting practice became more advanced than elsewhere in the world”; on the same line see also Fu, 1971. Indeed, 
accounting during the Tang and Song dynasties is said to have been quite sophisticated (Fu, 1986; Aiken & Lu, 1993a, 
1993b). However, the few papers available in English tend to be rather abstract, without entering in details in the 
functioning of the accounting system. In any case, the contents of reports are rarely discussed in depth (see for instance 
the references to important reports during the Tang & Song period by Aiken & Lu, 1993a, which would be very 
beneficial to investigate in depth, sharing the analysis with the international community). 
21
 That should include clan linage record keeping, e.g. Lee et. al., 1997.  
22
 Wagner research strategy is here interesting, also for our call for a research on the micro-foundations of the GDD. 
“There is no source which gives an overall description of the administration of the iron industry in the Song period, but 
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complexity must have been in place. In terms of internal organization, recording resources’ 
allocation and measuring outcomes had to be imperative. At least some empirical evidence exists, 
and can already be recalled here. 
 
F. Organizing people 
According to Yang (1989: 136-38), the internal division of labor of the Longjiang Shipyard and the 
Qingjiang Shipyard was sophisticated. During the Ming-Qing Period (1368–1911) these two 
government-run shipyards developed matrixes for the internal division of labor to address the issue 
of co-ordination and optimization in production.
 23
 The former places emphasis on vertical 
synchronization, within a divisional structure to organize one hundred artisans in each of them 
(Rudder and Oar; Cable and Iron; Hull and Deck; Mast and Sail division). The latter focuses 
attention on the horizontal balance amongst eight departments (Weaving; Bamboo-Processing; 
Cable; Hull; Blacksmith; Sail; Putty), although the number of workers is unknown. A shipyard 
would employ several hundred artisans who were divided into either four or eight divisions. In the 
four-division model, artisans belonged to eight departments of carpenters, blacksmiths, 
coppersmith, cable-markers, weavers, sewers, lacquers, and decorators and were expected to move 
from one division to another (A to D) to perform various tasks in order to build different parts of the 
ship. In the eight-division model, workers performed less tasks but specialized in making particular 
parts of the ship. One could speculate whether a Chinese manager would choose the first model if 
he wanted to produce many ships quickly because his workforce was fluid or the second model if he 
wanted ships to be of a high quality because his workforce had specialized skills. Discussion and 
debate about managerial choices had to be a prerequisite.  
Some major differences emerge at this level (even when focusing on the previous, more 
revolutionary period). “Ferrous-mining and metallurgical activity in eastern Shantung was carried 
on by local peasants, who were apparently organized into groups that resembled the so-called 
arbeitsgenossenschaften, or laborers’ associations, described by Gustav Schmoller. According to 
the German historian, the decisive feature of these associations was discontinuity. Bands of workers 
came together for only a few days or weeks each year for the specific purpose of hunting, fishing, or 
some other joint enterprise.” (Hartwell, 1966: 41) Also,  
“In eleventh- century China, similarly structured peasant-operated mines and foundries were the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
in the following a number of anecdotal sources will be considered which give glimpses of the industry as it could be 
seen at the local level.” (Wagner, 2001: 177) 
23
 Unfortunately, the time reference – as it is common in the Chinese historical debate – generally refers to the Ming-
Qing period, while for our kind of research questions, understanding what was the situation at the beginning or at the 
end of each of the two dynasties would be crucial. We still need also better information. 
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normal type of enterprise in eastern Shantung, and this organization characterized most 
establishments throughout the empire.” (Hartwell, 1966: 42) The institutional and social invention 
developed in Venice was the overcoming of the medieval form of organization, toward a permanent 
production entity. 
 
G. Counting production flows 
The Chinese management approach also suggests knowledge of input and output control. Different 
ship types and their production had to be identified and monitored. Table 1 hints at micro-level 
counting/tracking mechanisms in Chinese firms. For example, the Chinese manager had to know 
where his suppliers were to provide iron components to construct the hull and tung oil, lime and 
fiber from hemp/jute/ramie for caulking. He had to know where to obtain different types of timber 
and secure the supply in great micro-level detail in order to get his output.  
 
 
Table 1. Standard Material Inputs in Shipbuilding under the Ming Government Regulations 
 
Type/Material Amounta Amountb Total 
Transport ship (75 metric tons of loading capacity) 
  China fir planksc 320 67.2 m3 
  Other wood planksc 149 31.3 m3 
  Tree logs 20 – 
  Elm poles for rudders 2 – 
  Chestnut wood planksc 2 0.4 m3 
  Unknown wood for sweeps 38 – 
  Sub-total of Timber   98.9 m3 
  Iron nails/rivets and wires 35,742d – 
  Tung oil  3,012.8 catties 1,798 kg 1.8 t 
  Lime  9,037.8 catties 5,394 kg 5.4 t 
  hemp/jute/ramie  1,253.2 catties 748 kg 0.7 t 
 
Warship (27.4 m long, 9.4 m beam) 
  nanmue planks (m)f 571 55.2 m3 
  China fir planks (m)f 865 83.7 m3 
  pine planks (m)f 467 45.2 m3 
  Sub-total of Planks   184.1 m3 
  China fir poles for masts 2 – 
  unknown wood for sweeps 8 – 
  China fir poles for main sail frames 5 – 
  wood poles for small sail frames 2 – 
  China fir poles for bars 16 – 
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  China fir poles for flagpoles 16 – 
  elm poles for rudder 1 – 
  sandalwood poles for rudder control  2 – 
 
Source: Xu 1502.  
Note: a Quantity as recorded; b quantity converted; c the standard plank was x by 0.311 m by 2.18 m, with a minimum of 0.21 m3 (0.311 
m x 0.311 m x 2.18 m) (Song Y. 1637/1978: 234–50); d iron nails/rivets and wires were counted by pieces; e Phoebe nanmu; f total 
length which should be multiplied by 0.311 m2 to show wood volume. 
 
From an organizational point of view, the practice of measuring outputs seems to be rather 
well developed, suggesting that the Chinese handling of these issues of production management can 
be traced back to the Northern Song Period. Moreover, the scale and scope were substantive, with 
thousands of ships built per year (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Recorded Outputs, from the Song to the Ming 
   Average  Average 
Period Year Total output per year per month 
 
1. Unspecified ships 
     Song 995-97 – 3,237 269.8 
 1090-1100a – 3,000 250.0 
 1114 – 2,500 208.3 
 1165 500 500 41.7 
    Subaverage for Song   2,309 192.4 
    Subaverage unspecified ships (1)  2,300 192.4 
2. Transport ships 
      Song 1128 – 2,700 225.0 
      Yuan 1282 120 120 12.0 
 ?-1314b 1,800 – – 
 ?-1328b 1,800 – – 
      Ming 1403 525 525 43.8 
 1405 1,180 1,180 98.3 
 1412 2,000 2,000 166.7 
 1442 350 350 29.2 
 1451 180 180 15.0 
 1460 1,200 1,200 100.0 
3. Warships 
      Song 1042  500 500 41.7 
 1129  200 200 16.7 
 1169  270 270 22.5 
 1192  100 100 8.3 
     Yuan 1270 5,000 5,000  416.7 
 1273 2,000 2,000 166.7 
 1274-92 9,900 550 45.8 
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 (1274) (800)c (800) (66.7) 
 (1282) (3,000)c (3,000) (250.0) 
     Ming 1372 660 660 55.0 
 1451 440 440 36.7 
 
Source: Song S. 1242, vol. 145: ch. “Shihuo Wushi”; Tuotuo 1345, vol. 175: ch. “Shihuo Shang San”; Song L. 1370: ch. “Shihuozhi 
Haiyun,” “Shizu Jisi,” “Shizu Jiwu,” and “Shizu Jiba”; Bi Y. 1797: vol. 186; Xu S. 1809, vol. 145: ch. “Shihuo Zhi”; Sun G. 
1989: 370; Wang G. Z. 1991: 38; Zhang X. 1991: 79-83. 
Note: aA yearly quota fixed by Emperor Zhezong (1086-1100 A.D.) in 1090 A.D.; bthe starting period is unknown; cone-year figure, which 
is included in the 1274-92 period. 
 
 
 There were similar detailed records as shown by historians of that time (Xu in 1502; Li in 
1370). Unless the Chinese managers had a strong sense of production control and management, 
such calculations were both unnecessary and not possible. It is true that these are merely “physical” 
metrics, without monetary values. However, the detail seems to be more developed than the Venice 
reports, at least till Molin in 1633.  
 
H. Other data on the production process 
In terms of causal links between ship sizes and ranges of voyages, conceptually more geographic 
discoveries led to more and larger ships. If one takes the passenger-ship ratio as a proxy for the ship 
size and hence quality of ship design and shipbuilding, noticeable progress was made between 1284 
and 1412. This progress in ship design and shipbuilding coincided with the Ming multiple voyages 
to the Indian Ocean. Table 3 indicates expansion in the geographic scope of China’s sea-going 
activities from circa 893 AD to 1432. Before the Ming Period (1368-1644) Chinese fleets were 
based on coastal China. During the Ming, they began to have their bases in South Asia (Calicut) and 
Southeast Asia (Sumatra). Routine ship maintenance was very likely to have been carried out, 
outside China. This required management over a long distance.  
 
Table 3. Recorded scope of voyages 
 
Sea/Ocean Seasona Wind Fromb Tob Day(s) 
1. Tang      
East China Sea July (893) S.E. China Japan 14 
South China Sea -  -  Guangzhou Sri Lanka 42 
South China Sea -  -  China Persian Gulf 90 
2. Yuan      
East China Sea Jun. (1281) S.E. China Japan 18 
South China Sea Nov.-Dec. S Guangzhou Banda Acehc 40 
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South China Sea Nov.-Dec. S Guangzhou Sumatra 40 
3. Ming (Zheng He)d      
South China Sea Sep. (1409) S.E. Jiangsu Vietnam 10 
Indian Ocean - - Calicut Red Sea 28 
Indian Ocean Oct. (1432) S.E. Sumatra Calicut 38 
 
Source: Sun G. 1989: 162-5, 294-6, 298, 338, 362, 379, 384-5, 407-8, 410; Zhang X. 1986a: 43; Gao 1987: 33; Zhang X. 1991: 160, 162-
3, 165-6; Schurz 1985: 65. For Zheng He, see also Goodrich and Fang 1976: 195-8. 
Note: aConverted into the Christian calendar. bIf possible modern names are used to indicate their locations today, which means that the 
regions only roughly match those in history. cIn the northwest tip of Sumatra, Indonesia. dIncluding his detachments.  
 
Table 4. Passenger-carrying Capacities of Sea-Going Ships 
 
 
 
Source: aWei and Zhangsun 656 A.D.: ch. “Yangdi Ji”; Fan W. 1964-65, vol. 3-1: 282. bSong L. 1370: chs. “Riben Zhuan,” “Zhancheng 
Zhuan,” and “Zhaowa Zhuan”; Ke 1920: chs. “Riben Zhuan” and “Zhaowa Zhuan”; Chen B. 1606: vol. 5. cZhang X. 1986a: 72; 
Wang G. Z. 1991: 40.  
 
 
The point is that along all the changes and achievements in ship design, shipbuilding and 
sailing abroad there must have been considerable changes and improvements in Chinese 
management, regarding (1) how to better train and organize workforce, and (2) how to better 
allocate and manage its capital, technology and material. Otherwise, the new growth and 
development in sailing would not be possible; and China’s maritime ability would have stalled at 
the Tang level (Morse, 1926–9; Hatcher, 1986; Gordon, 1984a, 1984b; Howard et al., 1981; Mudge, 
1986). 
 
J. The Chinese State bureaucracy: material vs monetary system  
In searching and comparing accounting practices in Western Europe and China, it is vital for us to 
understand the general management style in the Chinese bureaucracy. What stands out most is the 
very long-lasting method of taxation through collection in kind (typically textiles, grain, animal 
fodder, and corvée services). This approach began in the Qing dynasty (221–207 BC) and continued 
until the later Qing (Qing: 1644–1911), even during the alleged centuries of influx of foreign silver 
to facilitate tax reform during circa 1565–1815 (see Liang, 1980). So, a material balance was of 
Period Year Total 
passengers 
Ships P-S 
ratio 
Index 
Tanga 644 43,000 500 86 100 
Yuanb 1284 15,000 200 75 87 
Mingc 1412 28,640 63 455  
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paramount importance in the government of finance, despite the fact that money was invented and 
used by the Chinese many centuries before the formation of the empire (see Liang, 1980). Such a 
non-monetary approach in government finance was deeply rooted in China’s state policy of 
physiocracy, where farming and food formed the backbone of the economy (see Will, 1990; Will 
and Wong, 1991; Deng G., 1999b). In practice, huge quantities of food and textiles were collected 
as government taxes, and then distributed as government payments (including salaries for officials, 
wages for artisans, living allowance for soldiers, and famine relief hand-outs). The clear advantage 
of this approach was that the basic needs and income of the state employees was guaranteed, 
without the shocks and price fluctuations of the market. In other words, the basic income of the 
state employees was automatically inflation-indexed. If so, prices were less useful.  
The long history of taxes in kind reveals the nature of barter trade in China and how the 
imperial state and its command economy handled such a trade. 
24
Moreover, institutionally speaking, 
China’s private landholding property rights (in either freehold or leasehold) and there consequent 
family farms resulted in large numbers of self-sufficient households that produced their own basic 
food and fabric to making a living. The monetized economy remained primarily an urban 
phenomenon, which never overtook China’s national economy as a whole.25 When it came to the 
micro-level, workers were routinely paid in food and shelter, with a cash payment being optional. 
So, a worker’s wage usually had two components: wage goods and wage cash. The share of “wage 
goods” was always higher than the cash payment. The following data shows the practice during the 
Ming-Qing Period (Li et al., 1983). Yet, the Ming-Qing Period is commonly regarded as the highest 
stage of monetization in the history of the empire (Table 5). 
 
Table 5: China’s wage payment structure (1) 
 
Period Value of ‘wage in 
food and shelter’ 
Value of 
‘wage cash’ 
1573–1619 81.6% 18.4% 
1628–1644 86.5% 13.5% 
1861–1874 71.0% 29.0% 
1875–1908 67.5% 32.5% 
 
                                                 
24
 Otherwise, if China had had an advanced monetary economy and an integrated domestic market, it would have been 
much easier to tax the public in cash. Of course, the advantage with taxes in kind was government revenues free from 
inflation and regional price differentiations. Logically, however, the state perpetual pursuit for such revenues only 
support the judgment that China’s domestic market economy was to a great extent barter-based. 
25 An optimistic estimate of the monetary proportion of China’s total Great Divergence during the late Qing is about 
half. If true, the use of money was optional especially in the primary sector (Deng, 2003). 
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Source: Zeyi, 1963: 97, 107. 
 
In the case of 7,055 workers in the three state-run silk textile factories in the Lower Yangzi 
Delta (as of 1745), Jiangning (Shanghai), Suzhou and Hangzhou, the same pattern existed. The 
government paid a total of 30,877 shi of white rice or unhusked rice (one shi white rice = ±75 kg) 
each year as workers’ wages in three factories (see Peng, 1963). As a result, a material balance 
sheet of food and shelter was used in these factories (Table 6). 
 
Table 6. China’s wage payment structure (2) 
 
Workers’ type Payment in 
food in value 
Payment 
in cash 
Unskilled 75% 25% 
Semi-skilled 67% 33% 
Skilled 43% 57% 
 
Source: Zeyi, 1963: 97, 107. 
 
Such an approach seems to have had a profound influence on China’s accounting practice: 
instead of counting monetary value or prices of inputs and outputs, the government and firms in 
China were likely to count and monitor material inputs and product outputs.
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 Later, we come 
across such a practice in China’s government-run shipyards, providing the foundation of how 
government shipyards in China were managed and monitored: instead of their monetary values, 
material inputs (timber, nails, tools and so forth) and outputs (ships) were counted. Furthermore, 
because with the material balance approach all items were inflation-indexed, prices became 
optional; and because government-run businesses were not profit seeking, prices were not an issue 
most of the time. Occasionally, officials did record prices as a one off, however their behavior 
remains unclear. In which ways materials quantities were translated into values inside the 
accounting system is still not clear. Curiously enough, such an issue is overlooked in Chinese 
accounting history, despite the implications it must have had on accounting practices and the whole 
functioning of the accounting system. The preconditions that were at stake in the Venice Arsenal – 
and the learning itself linked to the accounting processes – were not present in this situation within 
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 Fu (1971: 41) himself recognize however that “although money had existed since the Shang dynasty (1766 B.C. - 
1122 B.C.), funds consisted of both money and produce”. The main exception was China’s traditional money dealers 
(piaohao) who ran monetized accounts. This was not because they served a highly monetized economy but because 
they were specialized with handling money in a small sub-sector of the economy in China. 
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the Chinese state bureaucracies, which deeply affected accounting evolution in the two contexts. 
This represents an important issue in the research agenda for international accounting history 
emerging from our paper.
27
 
A final comment relates back to the issue of archive keeping in pre-modern China (prior to 
1644). In addition to what has already been pointed out in terms of destruction of archives and 
considering the material balance approach, even if all the dynastic archives had been preserved, 
there would have been a very good chance that there was no archive devoted to monetary 
accounting. This is supported by the fact that although the Qing state kept records of food prices on 
a regular basis (e.g. Kishimoto, 1997; Wang, 2013), a material balance was the dominant one in 
government taxation and granary management (Liang, 1980; Will 1990; Will and Wong, 1991; Liu, 
2015). As a result, as most practitioners in the field of historical national income can testify, the vast 
majority of figures for pre-modern China are yielded from estimation or mere “guestimation” 
(Maddison, 2007; Liu, 2015). 
 
K. Concluding remarks 
A lack of reference to micro issues in the whole debate about the great divergence appears to be a 
perspectival issue more than (or at least in addition to) an ontological one. We do not have evidence 
so far to argue whether even at the ontological level relevant differences between the East and the 
West existed. The lack of interest in managing/organizing/accounting discourse relates more to a 
lack in attitude by historians rather than by differences in history itself.  
Our current analysis is still unable – for lack of primary sources – to open the “black box” of 
the internal organization of permanent production in the Chinese context. In conclusion, we are not 
able to analytically investigate the specific elements of managerial practices in the Song period at 
this stage, as we were attempting to do in our comparison. While it is likely that the differences 
were huge considering the differences in the social and cultural contexts, and what we referred to as 
a different attitude toward a monetized economy, there are signals that the complexity in organizing 
during that period was a constitutive part of doing business, similar to what existed in the Venice 
Arsenal.  
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 Of course, in the profit-aiming private sector, the approach had to be different. For example, Pomeranz (1997: 20-5) 
presented a sizeable food-processing company Yutang (400 workers) in Jining City (150,000 residents in 1900), along 
the Grand Canal in late Qing throughout the Republican periods. Granted, the firm made continuous profit over time. 
However, even in the case of private business there is no evidence that it kept detailed accounts similar to those by the 
Venetians, not to mention that fact that the period during which the Yutang operated was already that of the early 
modern one in China. Foreign influence had to be already at present in society. In other words, the company was likely 
to be an early modern one instead of a genuinely traditional. Indeed, Pomeranz uses the adjective ‘traditional’ with 
reservation. 
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Although we are unable at this stage to provide adequate answers to our questions, the 
relevance of the questions themselves is nonetheless corroborated. We have addressed the issue of 
internal administrative coordination as an important missing link in the whole debate on the Great 
Divergence, opening up a completely new, and hopefully promising, perspective in this direction. 
Even without primary sources, by using triangulation with secondary ones – searching for glimpses, 
in Wagner’s (2001) words – encouraging suggestions are provided of the existence of 
organizational complexity even in early eras. The Song dynasty remains the best candidate, 
particularly for iron production but also for other sectors, including salt monopoly. More in general 
a possible research agenda would be considering the organization of the state itself and more 
precise attempts at reforming the state bureaucracy: the Fiscal reform of the Song dynasty, and the 
whole experiment of Wang Anshi’s reform (e.g. von Glahn, 2016: 236-42), including the 
establishment of examination and its evolution over time (Hartwell, 1971; Woodside, 2006). In that 
sense, a refocus of our research agenda could be targeted more precisely on the study of organizing 
of the state bureaucracy, under the specific lenses of micro analysis. 
28
 
We are calling for attention to focus on a new research area, the intersection between the 
Great Divergence and literatures dealing with the micro and in particular the management and 
accounting domains. We believe we have addressed a crucial question, though we have, at this stage 
being unable to provide sufficient answers. This is consistent with this type of research and the 
nature of an opening-up or exploratory paper, where raising questions – and the questions actually 
arisen – is more important than providing answers. We hope that we have been able to provide 
some important elements of the contexts that could play a relevant role in the overall explanation. 
A final point in our view deserves further attention in the future. The absence of an archive 
in China of a comparable value with the West (Venice in particular) in terms of distribution, amount 
of documents, periods etc. has been dealt with a sort of a mere “accident” of history, as a cause of 
difficult methodological issues for this kind of research. This deserves ad hoc investigation: to what 
extent archiving (and preserving the archives) is part of the different attitude, which is perhaps 
crucial in the differences in the evolution of different paths between the East and West is a further 
question in this research agenda. Is the 62 km of shelves still surviving at the Venice State Archive 
(as opposed to the lack of archives for China) an accident of history, or is itself part of the 
explanation of the Great Divergence? 
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 There is a curious analogy here with our research on the Venice Arsenal: the starting point was a debate between 
Venetianists (social historians, historians of architecture), without a specific understanding of administrative science, 
management and accounting. A need to read the available documents with the lenses of administration is here called 
for. 
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